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Im Auftrag

For the President of the European Patent Office

Le Président de l'Office européen des brevets
p.o.

R C van Dijk

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RANDOM NUMBER INSTEAD OF RANDOM PRIME

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present invention relates to a method for providing cryptographic keys which are usable in a network of connected computer nodes applying a signature scheme. Further, the present invention relates to a method for providing a signature value on a message in a network of connected computer nodes. Moreover, the present invention also relates to a method for verifying a signature value on a message in a network of connected computer nodes.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Many cryptographic schemes require the generation of a (random) prime each time it is used. Examples are signature schemes, group signature schemes, or credential systems, such as the so-called Cramer-Shoup signature scheme by R. Cramer and V. Shoup "Signature schemes based on the strong RSA assumption." In Proc. 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 46-52. ACM press, Nov. 1999, or the credential system by J. Camenisch and A. Lysyanskaya in their article "Efficient non-transferable anonymous multi-show credential system with optional anonymity revocation." In B. Pfitzmann, editor, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2001, volume 2045 of LNCS, pages 93-118, Springer Verlag, 2001. The security of all these schemes is based on the so-called strong RSA assumption. More precisely, their security proofs require that each signatures or credentials is computed using a unique prime, i.e., the computation of each signature or credential involves computing an e -th root where e is said unique prime. The e is also referred to as unique exponent in the following.

Unfortunately, the generation of primes is computationally expensive, especially if they need to be large. Because of this, the generation of signatures or credentials in the above mentioned schemes becomes computationally involved.

For the generation of primes one could in principle each time choose any integer as unique exponent, as long as it possesses a prime factor that does not appear in any unique exponent

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that was used before. This would require to store all exponents used so far and test the newly chosen exponent against these numbers; which, however, is very inefficient.

From the above it follows that there is still a need in the art that the generation of a signature is simplified for these schemes. Usually, a new prime is necessary each time a signature is generated, this is rather inefficient. Therefore, it is an object to provide cryptographic keys and signature values more efficiently. Each signature value should be verifiable.

GLOSSARY

The following are informal definitions to aid in the understanding of the description.

Credential: In the present context is understood under the term credential, a subset of access permissions (developed with the use of media-independent data) attesting to, or establishing, the identity of an entity, such as a birth certificate, driver's license, mother's maiden name, social security number, fingerprint, voice print, or other biometric parameter(s). Moreover, the credential comprises information, passed from one entity to another, used to establish the sending entity's access rights. The term certificate is understood as a particular credential stating that a certain public key belongs to a certain entity or user.

Signature: A digital signature consists of one or more values that relate a message to a public key. A signature can only be produced using the secret key corresponding to the public key.

The following signs relate to the terms indicated beside and are used within the description.

A, B, C, D computer nodes

20 p, q primes

n product of p and q

sk secret key being derived from p and q

A first random limit

v interval widths

25 A, v exponent-interval description

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- I exponent interval
- u, l security parameter
- e exponent value
- e' random prime
- 5 m message
- x' verification value
- H hash function
- QR_n elements having a square root modulo n
- y', h, x elements of QR_n
- 10 y computed signature root value
- y, y', e signature value
- h, x public values
- n, h, x, e', I public key value
- pk public key comprising public key value (n, h, x, e', I) and
- 15 exponent-interval description (A, v)
- u random bit-numbers

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SUMMARY AND ADVANTAGES OF THE INVENTION

Provided is an efficient scheme for generating a unique exponent or exponent value such that it is no longer necessary to generate a new prime for each use of them.

5 The scheme uses integers drawn from a particular interval instead of primes. Because choosing a random integer is much more efficient than choosing a prime at random, the issuing of signatures or credentials in resulting schemes will be more efficient.

The main observation that allows one to use composites, i.e. non-primes, instead of primes as in the above mentioned scheme is that it is in fact sufficient for the schemes' security if each unique exponent has a unique prime factor that is sufficiently large.

10 In general, at first a sufficiently large set of integers is determined such that all the integers in the set have a unique prime factor. Once this set is specified, one chooses as unique exponent a random element from the set. If the set is sufficiently large, one will with high probability not select the same element twice. This is most efficient if the set is an interval. Below it is described how to determine intervals such that each integer in the interval has a unique prime
15 factor.

In accordance with a first aspect of the present invention, there is given a method for providing cryptographic keys usable in a network of connected computer nodes A, B, C, D applying a signature scheme. The method executable by a first computer node A comprising the steps of:

- 20 - generating a random secret key sk ;
- generating an exponent interval I having a first random limit A , wherein, with a probability close to certainty, each element of the exponent interval I has a unique prime factor that is larger than a given security parameter l ;
- providing a public key pk comprising an exponent-interval description A , v and a public key
25 value n, h, x, e', I derived from the random secret key sk ,
- such that the random secret key sk and a selected exponent value e from the exponent interval I are usable for deriving a signature value y, y', e on a message m to be sent within the network to a second computer node B, C, D for verification.

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The step of generating a random secret key sk can comprise the use of two primes p and q . The product of the two primes can then be part of the public key pk . As this approach is based on the hardness of factoring a secure cryptographic system can be achieved.

5 In another approach the step of generating a random secret key sk can comprise selecting an integer value d which defines a class group G and selecting two elements g and z of the class group G . As this approach is based on the hardness of computing roots in groups of unknown order, a more secure cryptographic system can thus be provided. The step of providing the public key pk can then comprise computing a modified public key value d, h, x, e', I under use of the selected two elements g and z and the exponent interval I . This is further confirmed by
10 the hardness of computing roots in groups of unknown order and thus leads to an even more secure cryptographic system.

In accordance with a second aspect of the present invention, there is given a method for providing a signature value y, y', e on a message m in a network of connected computer nodes A, B, C, D, the method executable by a first computer node A comprising the steps of:

- 15 - selecting an exponent value e from an exponent interval I , wherein each element of the exponent interval I has, with a probability close to certainty, a unique prime factor that is larger than a given security parameter l ; and
- deriving the signature value y, y', e from a provided secret key sk , the selected exponent value e , and the message m , the signature value y, y', e being sendable within the network to a
20 second computer node B, C, D for verification.

The step of deriving the signature value y, y', e can further comprise a computation of the i -th root y of a value derived from the message m and the secret key sk using a cryptographic hash function H . The i is contemplated as the exponent value i . This allows the design of securer cryptographic systems.

25 In accordance with a third aspect of the present invention, there is given a method for verifying a signature value y, y', e on a message m in a network of connected computer nodes A, B, C, D, the method executable by a second computer B, C, D node comprising the steps of:

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- receiving the signature value y, y', e from a first computer node A; and
 - verifying whether an exponent value e is contained in an exponent interval I , wherein each element of the exponent interval I has, with a probability close to certainty, a unique prime factor that is larger than a given security parameter l , the signature value y, y', e is invalid if
- 5 the exponent value e is not contained in the exponent interval I .

The step of verifying can further comprise a computing step of raising a computed signature root value y to the power of the exponent value e . The computed signature root value y forms part of the signature value y, y', e .

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DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Preferred embodiments of the invention are described in detail below, by way of example only, with reference to the following schematic drawings.

- FIG. 1 shows a typical network with multiple computer nodes.
- 5 FIG. 2 shows a flow diagram according to a first aspect of the invention.
- FIG. 3 shows a flow diagram according to a second aspect of the invention.
- FIG. 4 shows a flow diagram according to a third aspect of the invention.

The drawings are provided for illustrative purpose only and do not necessarily represent practical examples of the present invention to scale.

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DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS

Fig. 1 shows a typical network with multiple computer nodes A, B, C, D, where each node can also be contemplated as participating network device. More particularly, the figure shows an example of a common computer system 2, where a random number r is generated. It consists here of four computer nodes A, B, C, and D which are connected via communication lines 5 to the network. Each computer node A, B, C, D may be any type of computer device known in the art from a computer on a chip or a wearable computer to a large computer system. The communication lines 5 can be any communication means commonly known to transmit data or messages from one computer node A, B, C, D to another. For instance, the communication lines 5 may be either single, bi-directional communication lines 5 between each pair of participating network devices A, B, C, D or one unidirectional line in each direction between each pair of computer nodes A, B, C, D. Such communication lines 5 are well known in the art. The common computer system 2 is shown to facilitate the description of the following random number generation protocol.

The following describes in more detail how cryptographic keys sk , pk can be provided as well as a signature value y , y' , e on a message m is created. Further, the verification of the signature value y , y' , e is shown in more detail.

Cryptographic keys

With reference to Fig. 2, the generation of a secret key sk and a public key pk is now described. The secret key sk and the public key pk are contemplated as cryptographic keys sk , pk which are usable in a network of the connected computer nodes A, B, C, D which apply a signature scheme. In the following it is assumed that the first computer node A executes the following steps. At first, as indicated in box 20, a random secret key sk is generated. For that two primes p and q forming the secret key can be used, whereby the product of the two primes p and q is part of the public key pk . Then an exponent interval I is chosen that can be determined according to the description below, whereby the exponent interval I has a first random limit A , as indicated in box 22. With a probability close to certainty, each element of the exponent interval I has a unique prime factor that is larger than a given security parameter l . More precisely, let n be the product of two sufficiently large primes p and q , h and x two

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elements from QR , and e' a random $l + 1$ bit prime. Let H be a hash function whose outputs have l bits. As indicated with box 24, the first computer node A performs some computations and selections in order to provide the public key pk as indicated with box 26. The public key pk finally comprises an exponent-interval description A, v and a public key value n, h, x, e', I which is derived from the random secret key sk . As indicated within box 24, the first computer node A selects an exponent value e from the exponent interval I and a random prime e' , computes the product n of the primes p and q and derives from n the two public values h, x . Thereby the random secret key sk and the selected exponent value e are usable for deriving a signature value y, y', e on a message m . This signature value y, y', e can then be sent within the network 5 to a second computer node B, C, D for verification purposes.

In a further embodiment, the generation of the random secret key sk comprises the selection of an integer value d which defines a class group G and the selection of two elements g and z of said class group G . Consequently, a modified public key value d, h, x, e', I can be provided under use of the selected two elements g and z and the exponent interval I , while e' is chosen randomly and h, x are calculated as follows:

$$h = g^{\prod_{e \in I} e}, \quad x = z^{\prod_{e \in I} e}.$$

As this is based on the hardness of computing roots in groups of unknown order, a secure cryptographic system can be provided.

Fig. 3 shows a flow diagram for deriving the signature value y, y', e that is sendable within the network to the second computer node B, C, D for verification. For the derivation the first computer node A performs a selection of an exponent value e from an exponent interval I as indicated with box 30, wherein each element of the exponent interval I has, with a probability close to certainty, a unique prime factor that is larger than a given security parameter l . The signature value y, y', e is then derived, as indicated with box 34 and mathematically shown below, from the provided secret key p and q as indicated with box 31, the selected exponent value e , the message m as indicated with box 32, and part of the public key value n, h, x, e' as indicated with box 33.

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In a further embodiment, the signature value y, y', e can be derived by computing the e -th root y of a value derived from the message m , also referred to as computed signature root value y , and the secret key sk by using a cryptographic hash function H .

Mathematically, to sign a message m , the signer, i.e. the first computer node A, chooses a
 5 random element y' from QR_n or from G , in case of class groups, and an exponent value e from I , and computes a y such that

$$y^e = xh^{H(x')}$$

$$y'^{e'} = x'h^{H(m)},$$

that means the computed signature root value y can be determined as follows

10

$$y = (x h^{H(y'^{e'} h^{-H(m)})})^{1/e}.$$

To verify a signature, one computes $x' = y'^{e'} h^{-H(m)}$ and checks that $y^e = xh^{H(x')}$ and $e \in I$ holds.

That means for verifying the signature value y, y', e on the message m one second computer
 node B, C, D receives the signature value y, y', e , as indicated with box 40, from the first
 15 computer node A. The second computer node B, C, D verifies by using the provided part of
 the public key value n, h, x, e' as indicated with box 33 whether or not the exponent value e is
 contained in the exponent interval I as indicated with box 44. Thereby each element of the
 exponent interval I should have, with a probability close to certainty, a unique prime factor
 that is larger than the given security parameter l . The signature value y, y', e is invalid if the
 20 exponent value e is not contained in the exponent interval I .

The check comprises computing y^e which means that the computed signature root value y that
 is part of the signature value y, y', e is raised to the power of the exponent value e as shown in
 the equation above.

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Choosing an Interval

In the following is addressed how an exponent interval I can be chosen. The above scheme can be shown secure if the interval I contains only few integers that have either a distinct prime factor larger than a certain size l or two distinct prime-factors larger than 2^v (the integers that do not meet these conditions are called (l,v) -smooth) and no integer with the largest prime factor smaller than 2^v . Therefore, in order to choose an interval I one need to evaluate the probabilities for that whether a randomly chosen interval meets this condition.

Let n_1 and n_2 denote the biggest and second biggest prime factor of number n , respectively. Define the quantities

$$10 \quad \Psi(x,y) = \#\{0 < n \leq x : n_1 \leq y\} \text{ and } \Psi(x,y,z) = \#\{0 < n \leq x : n_1 \leq y, n_2 \leq z\}.$$

It can be shown that the probability that randomly chosen interval $I = [A, A + 2^v]$, contains more than 2^{ws} integers that are (l,v) -smooth is at most $\Psi(A, 2^l, 2^v) 2^{ws} / A$ and that it contains no odd integer with a prime factor smaller than 2^v is at most $\Psi(A, 2^v) 2^v / A$, provided that $v < \log(A) < v^2$ holds. This now allows one to choose the A , l , and v (and thereby the interval) such that these probabilities are small, i.e., such that I meets the required condition with sufficiently high probability. To evaluate the quantities $\Psi(x,y)$ and $\Psi(x,y,z)$ one can use bounds on them that are found in literature.

Any disclosed embodiment may be combined with one or several of the other embodiments shown and/or described. This is also possible for one or more features of the embodiments.

- 20 The present invention can be realized in hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software. Any kind of computer system - or other apparatus adapted for carrying out the method described herein - is suited. A typical combination of hardware and software could be a general purpose computer system with a computer program that, when being loaded and executed, controls the computer system such that it carries out the methods described herein.
- 25 The present invention can also be embedded in a computer program product, which comprises all the features enabling the implementation of the methods described herein, and which - when loaded in a computer system - is able to carry out these methods.

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Computer program means or computer program in the present context mean any expression, in any language, code or notation, of a set of instructions intended to cause a system having an information processing capability to perform a particular function either directly or after either or both of the following a) conversion to another language, code or notation; b) reproduction
5 in a different material form.

CLAIMS

1. A method for providing cryptographic keys (sk, pk) usable in a network of connected computer nodes (A, B, C, D) applying a signature scheme, the method executable by a first computer node (A) comprising the steps of:
 - 5 - generating a random secret key (sk);
 - generating an exponent interval (I) having a first random limit (A), wherein, with a probability close to certainty, each element of the exponent interval (I) has a unique prime factor that is larger than a given security parameter (l);
 - providing a public key (pk) comprising an exponent-interval description (A, v) and a public key value (n, h, x, e', I) derived from the random secret key (sk),
 - 10 such that the random secret key (sk) and a selected exponent value (e) from the exponent interval (I) are usable for deriving a signature value (y, y', e) on a message (m) to be sent within the network to a second computer node (B, C, D) for verification.
- 15 2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the step of generating a random secret key (sk) comprises using two primes (p, q), the product of which is part of the public key (pk).
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the step of generating a random secret key (sk) comprises selecting an integer value (d) defining a class group (G) and selecting two elements (g, z) of the class group (G).
- 20 4. The method according to claim 3, wherein the step of providing a public key (pk) comprises computing a modified public key value (d, h, x, e', I) under use of the selected two elements (g, z) and the exponent interval (I).

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5. A method for providing a signature value (y, y', e) on a message (m) in a network of connected computer nodes (A, B, C, D) , the method executable by a first computer node (A) comprising the steps of:
- selecting an exponent value (e) from an exponent interval (I) , wherein each element of the exponent interval (I) has, with a probability close to certainty, a unique prime factor that is larger than a given security parameter (l) ; and
 - deriving the signature value (y, y', e) from a provided secret key (sk) , the selected exponent value (e) , and the message (m) , the signature value (y, y', e) being sendable within the network to a second computer node (B, C, D) for verification.
6. The method according to claim 5, wherein the step of deriving the signature value (y, y', e) further comprises a computation of the i -th root (y) of a value derived from the message (m) and the secret key (sk) using a cryptographic hash function (H) , the i being the exponent value (i) .
7. A method for verifying a signature value (y, y', e) on a message (m) in a network of connected computer nodes (A, B, C, D) , the method executable by a second computer (B, C, D) node comprising the steps of:
- receiving the signature value (y, y', e) from a first computer node (A) ; and
 - verifying whether an exponent value (e) is contained in an exponent interval (I) , wherein each element of the exponent interval (I) has, with a probability close to certainty, a unique prime factor that is larger than a given security parameter (l) , the signature value (y, y', e) is invalid if the exponent value (e) is not contained in the exponent interval (I) .
8. The method according to claim 7, wherein the step of verifying further comprises a computing step of raising a computed signature root value (y) that being part of the signature value (y, y', e) to the power of the exponent value (e) .
9. A computer program element comprising program code means for performing a method of any one of the claims 1 to 8 when said program is run on a computer.

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10. A computer program product stored on a computer usable medium, comprising computer readable program means for causing a computer to perform a method according to anyone of the preceding claims 1 to 8.
- 5 11. A computer device (A, B, C, D) comprising:
a computer program product according to claim 9; and
a processor for executing the computer program product when the computer program product is run on the computer device.

* * *

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


Fig. 1

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


Fig. 2

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


Fig. 3

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


Fig. 4

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Abstract**RANDOM NUMBER INSTEAD OF RANDOM PRIME**

The present invention relates to a method for providing cryptographic keys which are usable in a network of connected computer nodes applying a signature scheme. Further, the present
5 invention relates to a method for providing a signature value on a message in a network of connected computer nodes and a method for verifying the signature value on the message.

[Fig. 2]